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Abstract
Multinational firms are believed to impact the productivity of domestic firms
through worker mobility. Fosfuri et al. (2001) suggest that worker mobility and
technological spillovers are more likely to materialize when the local and the
multinational firm do not compete fiercely in the product market. We assess
empirically the importance of the hypothesis by using the Finnish longitudinal
employer-employee data. Consistent with the predictions of the model, we find
that competition is negatively related to worker mobility but only in high-tech
industries where productivity spillovers are present. Thus, our results detail a
channel through which competition may negatively affect the productivity of
purely domestic firms.
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1 Introduction
The entry of multinational firms (MNEs) and inward foreign direct investments (FDI)
are believed to bring productivity improvements in the domestic economy. Multina-
tionals tend to have some competitive advantage based on superior technology or other
firm-specific knowledge, and part of this knowledge is believed to spill over and to im-
prove the productivity of domestic firms. One channel for the spillover effects is worker
mobility. Positive spillover effects may in fact arise as former employees of MNEs join
domestic firms and bring with them the technological, marketing and managerial knowl-
edge that they have acquired (Blomstro¨m and Kokko, 1998). However, worker mobility
within an industry cannot be thought of as exogenous since it might be affected, for in-
stance, by the intensity of product market competition. If this is the case, competition
could have an indirect effect on industry level productivity by potentially enhancing or
hampering worker mobility and the diffusion of knowledge through this channel.
The existence of this indirect channel has been recognized theoretically by Fosfuri,
Motta and Rønde (2001). They develop a two-period oligopoly model, which predicts
that the degree of competition is likely to play an important role in the occurrence of
technology spillovers since it affects differently the incentives of multinational and local
firms to keep and to hire workers. However, the link between the degree of product
competition and the extent of technology spillovers from multinationals to domestic
firms has ”rarely been explored in the literature as it raises complex methodological
problems”, as stated by Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004). In their view, it is
very difficult to disentangle empirically the two effects on the total factor productivity
(TFP) of local firms. In this paper, we propose a solution to this problem by using
a two-step approach. In the first step, we explore empirically the direct link between
product market competition and worker mobility, while in the second step, we analyze
on the effect of worker mobility on productivity. Although there is already established
empirical evidence exploring our second step, the relationship between competition and
mobility is far less investigated.1
Our paper departs from a theoretical formalization of spillovers by Fosfuri et al.
(2001).2 In the first period, a multinational firm provides training to a local worker and
1See the next section for a selected review of the recent empirical literature on these two issues.
2Glass and Saggi (2002) also develop a theoretical model along similar lines, but they do not directly
focus on the role played by product market competion. Their main conclusions can be summarized as
follow. Firstly, the MNE has the incentive to prevent workers’ mobility only when technology transfer is
incomplete since the required wage premium would be larger - the more complete is technology transfer.
Secondly, and possibly more interestingly, the presence of multiple MNEs increases the likelihood of
workers’ mobility whereas the presence of multiple local firms decreases it. The intuition for this
second result is obvious. The incentive to prevent technology transfers is weakened by the presence of
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gains monopoly profits by using a superior technology. If the multinational keeps the
trained worker in the second period, it also keeps gaining monopoly profits. However,
in the second period the multinational firm faces competition for the worker from a
local firm which realizes that it could also gain access to the technology by hiring
the trained worker. Competition for the worker is modelled as a first-price auction:
the firm who offers a higher wage hires the worker and pays the wage it has offered.
Clearly, the multinational firm has the incentive to offer more (less) than the local firm
if the reduction in its profits following entry is larger (smaller) than the duopoly profits
occurring to the local firm. A sufficient condition for this to be the case occurs when the
so-called “joint profit” condition holds, that is, when the sum of the gross profits of two
duopolists using the technology is larger than the gross profit of a monopolist. In turn,
the duopoly profits are sufficiently high to assure the “joint profit” condition when the
mode competition is not too intense (e.g. collusion vs Cournot vs Bertrand) or/and
when the products offered by the two firms are not close substitutes (e.g. independent
vs differentiated vs homogenous). As a consequence, the mobility of workers is more
likely to be observed when the local and the multinational firm do not compete fiercely
in the product market, or when they sell in independent or vertically related markets.
The same authors also note that the extent to which technological spillovers occur
depends on the nature of the technology and how easily it can be transferred. In
particular, the model predicts higher labor mobility and more technological spillovers
when the absorptive capacity of the local firm is sufficiently high and when on-the-job
training is general rather than specific.
Our contribution to the literature on this issue is twofold. Firstly, we analyze how
worker mobility as a mechanism of technology diffusion responds both to the degree of
competition in the product market and to the absorptive capacity of the local firms.
This part of our analysis contributes to the literature on FDI and spillovers with new
empirical evidence on the relationship between competition and worker mobility. As
noted by Fosfuri et al. (2001), testing their predictions requires very disaggregated
data, which explains why at the time of publication of their paper they claimed, and
rightly so, that ”this analysis has not been undertaken”. To reach our goals, we exploit
the availability of a large employer-employee panel data-set from Finland (FLEED)
for 1990-2006. The possibility of following workers over time opens a completely new
research dimension since we can model the mobility patterns from multinationals to
multiple MNEs since each of them has the incentive not to offer a wage premium presuming that all
other foreign subsidiaries will do so. On the other hand, with many local firms competing in the same
market, the benefit of restricting technology transfers is large since the MNE can increase the cost of
all local competitors by paying the wage premium.
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local firms in a multivariate duration framework and test the hypotheses of interest in
a rigorous way. Secondly, we also contribute to the recent growing literature on the
economic importance of productivity spillovers, and on the conditions when they arise.
This allows us to test whether the transmission mechanism that we are analyzing is
indeed present in our data.
Our empirical results suggest that a more competitive environment restrains worker
mobility. More specifically, workers are more likely to move from multinational to non-
multinational firms when the firms operate in a less competitive industry with higher
price cost margins, or when the sending multinational firm and the receiving domestic
firm operate in different industries. These results are consistent with the predictions
put forward by Fosfuri et al. (2001). We also find that productivity spillovers through
worker mobility exist but they are not economy-wide. By distinguishing between firms
in high- and low-tech industries according to their level of R&D expenditures, we find
productivity spillovers that are both economically large and statistically significant, but
only for high-tech industries. According to our preferred estimates, workers with former
multinational experience are 37 percent more productive than their colleagues without
such an experience. This is consistent with the transfer of technological knowledge
through worker mobility. We also find that the absorptive capacity of the local firm,
measured in terms of productivity gap between the local and the multinational firms
within the same industry, affects the potential for productivity spillovers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the
recent empirical literature on the relationship between worker mobility and productivity.
Section 3 describes our data sets and provides descriptive evidence on several aspects
of worker mobility. In Section 4, we present our two-step empirical analysis, first the
econometric framework and the results for worker mobility and thereafter the model
and the results for quantifying the productivity spillovers. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Empirical Literature
In the last decade, the increased availability of linked employer-employee data-sets
has allowed researchers to start opening the black box of technology spillovers and, in
particular, to study the relevance of the worker mobility channel much more precisely.
In fact, data availability has made it possible to build plant (or firm) specific measures
quantifying the impact of the workers with previous experience from multinationals.
These measures have been used in augmented productivity equations as a replacement
for the standard, and far less accurate, proxy used in the older literature based on the
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share of output produced by multinationals operating in the same industry and/or in
the same geographical area.
The previous empirical research has focused on the spillover effects without taking
into account the possible simultaneous competition effects. Studies by Balsvik (2011)
and Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) have found positive firm-level productivity effects
through employer mobility by using comprehensive employer-employee data-sets respec-
tively for Norway and Denmark. Balsvik provides a number of complementary pieces
of empirical evidence which are broadly consistent with the existence of a channel for
technology spillovers through worker mobility. She finds a large productivity differential
(20 percent) in local plants between workers with MNE experience and their colleagues
without such experience, even after controlling for unobserved characteristics of the
workers. Coupled with the finding of a 5 percent premium for movers from MNEs to
domestic plants, when compared to stayers in local plants with similar characteristics,
she concludes that local firms do not fully pay for the value of the workers to the firm
and thus worker mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs is found to be a source of knowledge
externality in Norwegian manufacturing.
Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) study knowledge transfers in general without a specific
focus on the dynamics between MNEs and domestic firms. They find that hiring workers
from more productive firms implies gains amounting to a 0.35 percent productivity
increase for the average firm one year after hiring. This increase in productivity lasts
four years and the associated cumulative gain for four consecutive years is 1.64 percent
which is equivalent to a 2.3 percentile move up in the productivity distribution by the
median firm in Danish manufacturing. On a related issue, Go¨rg and Strobl (2005)
exploit firm-level data from Ghana with information on whether entrepreneurs were
former employees of MNEs. Their overall analysis provides evidence that domestic
firms run by entrepreneurs with experience from working for multinationals in the same
industry are more productive and more likely to survive than other firms. There are also
a number of studies specifically focusing on R&D spillovers. These include Maliranta,
Mohnen and Rouvinen (2009), Kaiser, Kongsted and Rønde (2011, 2015) and Parrotta
and Pozzoli (2012) who find that the hiring of workers from R&D intensive or innovative
firms is associated with improved performance or increased innovative activity by the
hiring firms.
The studies by Poole (2013) and Pesola (2011) focus on workers and wages rather
than on firms/plants and productivity. Poole (2013) finds evidence of positive wage
spillovers by using Brazilian data. When workers leave multinationals and are rehired
at domestic establishments, continuing domestic workers’ wages increase. She also
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investigates where spillovers occur and how they are absorbed. She finds that higher-
skilled former multinational workers are better able to transfer information and higher-
skilled incumbent domestic workers are better able to absorb information. Pesola (2011)
analyzes the extent to which employees benefit from the knowledge they acquire in
foreign-owned firms when moving to domestic firms and, in particular, whether this
rent is related to their educational level. She exploits a sample of the total Finnish
linked employer-employee data set that we use. Her main finding suggests that previous
tenure in a foreign firm has a positive effect on wages, but only for workers located at
the top of the distribution of educational levels. These results are consistent with the
idea that domestic firms may want to pay higher wages to workers with multinational
experience in order to gain access to their knowledge.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, there is only one other paper that looks directly
at the effects of competition on labor mobility (see Castillo et al, 2016). In particular,
they exploit data on firm participation to an innovation support program in Argentina
(FONTAT) and study workers mobility from participating to non-participating firms.
They find that in industries where concentration is low non-participating firms are
willing to pay a wage premium to acquire skilled workers which is higher than the
premium participating firms are willing to pay to retain them. On the contrary, in more
concentrated industries participating firms are willing to pay a higher wage premium
than non-participating firms in order to prevent mobility.
As already mentioned, our primary and novel contribution to the previous literature
is to analyze how worker mobility as a mechanism of technology diffusion from MNEs
to local firms responds both to the degree of competition in the product market and to
the absorptive capacity of the local firms. In addition, we also build on the approach
proposed by Balsvik (2011) and test whether and in which type of industries worker
mobility from multinationals to local firms generates productivity spillover effects in
local firms. The productivity spillover analysis is obviously of paramount importance
for the main purpose of this paper. Indeed, finding no effect in our data would make
the analysis of the effect of competition and absorptive capacity on worker mobility
far less interesting, simply because the transmission channel going from competition to
productivity via worker mobility would not be there.
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3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data
We use data from three different data-bases from Statistics Finland for the years 1990
to 2006. The main data-base is the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data
(FLEED). The data include all Finnish firms and all individuals of ages 15-70. The
FLEED data are complemented with plant-level statistics from the Longitudinal Data
on Plants in Manufacturing (LDMP), which include all manufacturing plants with at
least five employees, and with firm register information on whether the firm is foreign
or domestic-owned and on whether the firm is multinational. Firm- and plant-level
statistics include variables such as industry codes, value added, capital stock, number
of employees, wages, turnover/sales an R&D expenditure.3 We restrict our analysis
to manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees and to the period of 1997-2004.4 A
domestic MNE is defined as a domestic firm with operations abroad and a foreign MNE
is a firm with at least 20 percent of foreign ownership.5 Each individual is followed over
time. An individual exits the data if he/she turns 70 years old, leaves the country
or dies. The individual-level statistics contain detailed information on characteristics
including education, occupation, annual earnings, gender, family status, work status
and previous work history. All data-sets are linked together with unique individual,
plant and firm identifiers.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 present some preliminary features of multinational and non-multinational
firms in the manufacturing sector both at firm and plant level.6 As it can be seen from
Table 1, the number of non-multinational firms is more than twice as large as the
number of multinational firms, but multinational firms tend to own several plants and
to run much larger operations than purely local firms in terms of median number of
employees, turnover and value added (see Table 2). When focusing on median values,
3As a general rule, R&D data are collected for all enterprises with more than 100 employees and
for a sample of enterprises with 10-99 employees.
4Register information on whether the firm is multinational is available from 1997 onward and
information on start and end dates of employment spells exist until 2004 which restricts the period of
analysis to 1997-2004. Firms which have more than 20 employees in 1997 but fall under this threshold
in subsequent years are also included.
5We check if our empirical results are sensitive to the choice of a 20 percent threshold by using
alternative thresholds of ten and fifty percent. All our main findings are virtually unaltered.
6Multinational firms include both foreign and domestically owned firms. In our econometric analysis
we also investigate whether the type of ownership matters and we do not find significant differences.
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multinationals have a smaller wage bill relative to turnover than domestic firms, use
capital more intensively and invest in R&D more than purely domestic local firms.
Finally, multinational firms are found to be more profitable as documented by the
higher share of gross operating profits over turnover (PCM).
Tables 3 and 4 display statistics quantifying employees entering both domestic non-
multinational firms and multinational firms in the manufacturing sector. In Table 3, we
distinguish All entrants and New entrants in the current year. All entrants is defined
as the accumulated net number of entrants from current year and previous years as
early as the data set allows (since 1990).7 New entrants include the employees starting
to work at the firm only in the current year. As can be easily detected by looking at
Table 3, the share of All entrants increases over the period. It may be noticed that
also the shares of New entrants slightly increase, but the increase is not monotonous
over the time period. In Table 4, we distinguish All entrants to non-multinational firms
according to whether the sending firm is multinational or not. We may note that the
share of entrants coming from multinational firms increases more distinctly over time
as multinational firms gain importance in the economy. In 2004, the share of workers
in domestic firms with previous tenure in a MNE is as high as 6.4 percent.
Table 5 displays some characteristics of entrants at entry year. Overall, MNEs are
found to assume a larger share of female workers, employees with a longer education and
a longer previous tenure than non-MNEs (see columns (i) and (v)). When we focus only
on workers with previous tenure (see columns (ii) and (iii) for MNEs and columns (vi)
and (vii) for non-MNEs), we observe that movers coming from MNEs are older, have
a slightly longer education and a longer previous tenure.8 This holds both for MNEs
and for non-MNEs as destination firms. Also, the differences between the means are
statistically significant for all variables. Overall, this evidence shows therefore not only
that MNEs tend to assume on average more educated and experienced workers than
non-MNEs but also that the subset of workers moving from MNEs to other firms (both
MNEs and non-MNEs) is more educated and experienced than the subset moving from
non-MNEs. In short, these results suggest that movers from MNEs are more qualified
and therefore have the potential to transfer the knowledge acquired during the previous
tenure.
In Tables 6 and 7, we finally provide descriptive evidence on the transitions occur-
ring between different types of firms. In Table 6, we analyze four different types of
transitions; from MNEs to both non-MNEs and other MNEs and from non-MNEs to
7All entrants is used to compute the shares of workers with and without multinational experience
which enter the productivity equations. See Section 4.3. for the details.
8We include workers with a minimum of two years of tenure from the previous employer.
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both MNEs and non-MNEs. The yearly transitions from MNEs to non-MNEs vary from
1.6 to 2.2 percent of total employees. The annual share of employees moving to other
MNEs is larger and varies more over time.9 We also observe an asymmetric pattern for
the employees leaving non-MNEs. Comparatively a larger number is found to move to
other non-MNEs than to MNEs. This overall pattern suggests that employees tend to
change employers more frequently within the same type of firms.
Since our primary interest is to analyze whether worker mobility generates produc-
tivity spillovers in the non-multinational firms, Table 7 reports statistics on workers
moving from multinational to non-multinational firms. We split the sample by the in-
dustry of the sending firms into low-tech and high-tech industries, since previous studies
by Maliranta et al. (2009), Kaiser et al. (2011, 2015) and Parrotta and Pozzoli (2012)
have found the hiring of workers from R&D intensive or innovative firms to be linked
to better performance by hiring firms.10 Furthermore, we separate inter- and intra-
industry transitions since Fosfuri et al. (2001) predict worker mobility and spillovers
to be more likely when the local and the multinational firm do not compete fiercely in
the product market or sell in independent or vertically related markets.
It is obvious from Table 7 that most workers moving from MNEs to non-MNEs
change industry.11 For instance, in 1997, the share of inter-industry movers on total
movers is 88.1 percent in low-tech and 92.3 percent in high-tech industries. This finding
is not peculiar only to 1997 since this share is found to be higher in high-tech industries
in most years. Although not conclusive, this observation is consistent with Fosfuri et
al. model, which predicts that mobility is more likely to occur between firms operating
in independent or vertically related markets. Also, the finding that the share of intra-
industry mobility is lower in high-tech industries points out to the fact that within
industry mobility is less frequent precisely in those industries where spillovers are more
likely to materialize.
9A transition is identified when an employee changes both plant and firm identity codes of his/her
employer between year t and t+1. In most mergers and acquisitions, codes of the plants belonging
to the target firm remain unchanged while she gets a new firm code. This implies that mergers
and acquisitions are not per se accounted as transitions of employees unless they are followed by
restructuring causing employees to move to other plants and firms. In 2004 there was an increase in
transitions from MNEs to MNEs (the last row of columns (iii) and (iv) in Table 6) and in the share of
intra-industry transitions from MNEs to non-MNEs in high-tech industries (the last row of columns
(v), (vi) and (vii) in Table 7) due to restructuring following company consolidations.
10High-tech firms are defined as firms belonging to the tertiary of three-digit industries with the
highest R&D expenditures (industries with more than 2.55% R&D expenditures on total sales in
1997). All other firms are defined as Low/Medium tech firms.
11In Table 7, industries are defined at the three-digit level and industry changes are defined accord-
ingly. In the econometric section, our main results are based on intra- and inter-industry mobility at
three-digit level, but we use also the two-digit level of industry in some specifications as robustness
check.
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4 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical strategy consists of two complementary sets of econometric estimates.
The first part of the analysis serves the main purpose of this paper. In particular, we
explore whether the evidence based on our data is in line with the hypotheses of Fosfuri
et al. on the impact of competition on worker mobility. In the second part of the
analysis, we estimate an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function with firm-level
data. This allows us to establish whether worker mobility from multinationals to local
firms has a positive effect on the total factor productivity of local firms. We model
the mobility patterns from multinationals to local firms in a multivariate duration
framework to analyze how worker mobility as a mechanism of technology diffusion
responds to the degree of competition in the product market. More specifically, we
apply the competing risks framework to the analysis of the effect of product market
competition. This general transition model accommodates situations like ours that
involve more than one destination and can be therefore interpreted as a multivariate
duration model involving the joint specification and estimation of two or more hazard
functions.
4.1 Worker Mobility: Econometric Framework
Albeit the focus of this paper is on the role played by product market competition on
the mobility from a multinational to a local firm, we have to take into account that a
worker operating in a multinational firm faces J distinct destinations and therefore J
associated latent durations, of which only the shortest is identifiable by the data. In
our application a worker employed by a multinational firm could in fact alternatively:
i) move to a local firm in the same industry or in a different industry, ii) move to a
different multinational firm, iii) turn into self employment, iv) enter unemployment or
v) exit the labor market. These destinations are competing events. Unlike censoring,
which merely precludes the view of the event of interest, a competing event precludes
the occurrence of the primary event of interest altogether. If these latent durations
were independently distributed, it would be, however, perfectly legitimate to apply the
standard proportional hazards regression model exclusively to the transition of interest
to estimate the impact of a change in a given covariate, xk on the probability of leaving
the initial state at or before time t (van den Berg (2005)). Economic theory, however,
suggests that the durations are unlikely to be independent in our application since
workers differ because of both observable (e.g. age and gender) and unobservable (e.g.
taste for mobility) characteristics and, in turn, these characteristics are expected to be
10
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related to different forms of mobility.
If independency is not assumed, computing–and even signing– the marginal effect
of interest is a much more difficult task which requires the estimation of multivariate
duration models.12 This is because the relevant CIF (Cumulative Incidence Function)
will depend not only on the cause-specific hazard functions of the destination of interest
but also on all other cause-specific hazard functions.13 To overcome this problem we
adopt the approach proposed by Fine and Grey (1999). Basically, they introduce the
so-called sub-distribution hazard and show that the CIF–and therefore the implied
marginal effects–can be easily computed as a function of the sub-distribution hazards
of the event of interest only.14 Their approach is semi-parametric in that the baseline
sub-hazard of the event of interest is left unspecified, and the effects of covariates are
assumed to be proportional.
Our purpose is to explore the empirical relevance of the two main hypotheses de-
rived from the model of Fosfuri et al. (2001). That is, whether worker mobility and
technological spillovers are more likely to materialize when the local and the multi-
national firm do not compete fiercely in the product market or sell in independent or
vertically related markets, and whether technology transfer is more likely to occur when
the absorptive capacity of the local firm is sufficiently high. Competition is expected to
be more intensive and, therefore, to have a negative effect on worker mobility between
firms within the same industry, as compared to worker mobility between firms in differ-
ent industries. We run separate regressions to assess whether the effect of competition
differs for intra- and inter-industry worker mobility.
To analyze the effect of the toughness of competition on the incentive for the multi-
national to keep the worker, we follow Aghion, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005)
and Nickell (1996) and we adopt the Lerner Index as main indicator of product market
competition. This measure has several advantages over other observable competition
indicators such as market shares or the Herfindahl concentration index. These other
measures rely more directly on precise definitions of geographic and product markets,
which is particularly difficult in our application, as multinational firms operate in inter-
national markets, so that market concentration measures based only on Finnish data
12The most popular framework is the so-called competing risks model. Recent surveys can be found
in Putter et al (2006) for biostatistics and van den Berg (2005) for economics.
13However, Thomas (1996) shows that, with competing risks models of the proportional hazard type,
marginal effects can be signed if the estimated coefficient in the relevant cause-specific hazard function
is larger than the corresponding coefficients in all other cause-specific hazard functions.
14The main difference between the two hazard functions is that individuals leaving the initial state
to another destination remains in the risk set for the sub-distribution hazard but leaves it instead for
the cause-specific hazard.
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may be extremely misleading. Operationally, we compute the price-cost margin at the
firm level as operating profits net of the cost of capital divided by value added .15
Operating profits are computed as value added minus wages and salaries and other
personnel expenses. The cost of capital is assumed to be 0.085 for all firms and time
periods (same as Aghion et al. assume). Our main competition measure is defined
simply as the weighted average of the price cost margin across firms within the same
three-digit industry:
InvCompetitionjt =
∑
i
xijt∑
i
xijt
OPijt − CCijt
V Aijt
(1)
where OPijt, CCijt, V Aijt and xijt denote respectively operating profits, cost of capital,
value added and output of firm i in industry j at time t. A value of 0 indicates perfect
competition (price equals marginal cost) while values above 0 indicate some degree of
market power. As robustness, we also define an alternative competition measure, where
the cost of capital is not included, as:
Alt InvCompetitionjt =
∑
i
xijt∑
i
xijt
OPijt
xijt
(2)
As before larger values indicate larger operating profits and less fierce competition.
An obvious concern with our estimation model is that the firms’ decisions affecting
worker mobility are jointly determined with those affecting competition. When esti-
mating competing risk models like ours, we therefore lack a fully satisfactory method
of confronting the challenges of causal identification.16 For this reason, we are careful
not to interpret the estimated coefficients as consistent measures of the direct causal
effect and focus instead on the differences in the estimated coefficients across industries
or types of firms.
In addition to competition, we also aim to assess the importance of absorptive
capacity of the receiving firm for intra-industry mobility. We therefore compute a firm-
specific productivity gap measure (Prodgap) as:
Prodgapijt = TFPijt − TFP jt (3)
15We use the measure of value added computed by Statistics Finland as corrected operating profit
+ wages and salaries + other personnel expenses.
16We refrain from using lags of potentially endogenous variables since its use is almost never justified
on identification grounds (see e.g. Bellemare, Masaki and Pepinsky, 2015). In general, replacing
contemporaneous with lagged regressors simply modifies the channel through which endogeneity biases
estimates of causal effects.
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where TFPijt denotes the total factor productivity of the multinational firm i in indus-
try j at time t where worker is moving from and and TFP jt denotes the average total
factor productivity of non-multinational firms in industry j at time t.17 As the main
proxy for absorptive capacity, we use therefore the productivity gap between the send-
ing MNE and the average domestic non-MNE firm in the same three-digit industry.18
In order to capture the impact of productivity lead of a multinational firm in relation
to non-multinational firms, we replace negative values of the gap measure with zeros.
Since this measure could be sensitive to extreme observations, particularly in small in-
dustries, we also use the same measure at the two-digit level as robustness check.19 To
sum up, the aim of the multivariate duration analysis is to determine whether and how
InvCompetition and Prodgap are related to the probability of moving to a domestic
firm, controlling for the other individual- and firm-specific covariates.
4.2 Worker Mobility: Results
In our estimations, we distinguish intra- and inter-industry mobility and mobility within
low- and high-tech industries. We first identify those workers who are employed in a
multinational in 1997 and we trace them over the entire sample period. Predictions
received from the theory suggest that InvCompetition should enter with a positive
sign in the specifications for intra-industry worker mobility, indicating that less fierce
competition in the product market increases worker mobility between firms in the same
industry. Since InvCompetition is defined at the industry of origin level, it is less
obvious that the same relationship is expected to hold in inter-industry transitions. This
would, however, be the case if, for instance, the replacement cost of the trained worker
is assumed to be related to the degree of competition in the industry of origin.20 In
all regressions, we also include several standard individual level variables: age, gender,
marital and parenthood status, educational level, income and regional location. Finally,
17Productivity is estimated at plant-level as described in section 4.3. For multi-plant firms produc-
tivity is computed as the weighted average of the estimated productivity of firm i’s plants in industry
j (either at 2- or 3-digit level of industries) and output is used as weights. In multi-to-multi mobility
regressions, we also use an alternative measure defined as the productivity gap between the sending
MNE and the average of the MNEs in the same industry.
18We do so since we cannot include a direct measure of the productivity of the receiving firm. This
is obviously not observable when there is no transition or when the transition is one of the competing
events where the destination firm is not identified (enter unemployment or exit the labor market).
19In addition, we also rerun all estimated models presented in the next sub-section without setting
equal to zero all negative values of the gap measure. This change has no effect on our main results.
These additional estimated equations are reported in Table A3 of the web appendix.
20In inter-industry mobility equations, variables capturing the degree of competition in the destina-
tion industry cannot be included since this piece of information is not available for all those workers
who do not move over the sample period or who move to unemployment or out of the labor market.
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this baseline model is augmented with (log) firm size and with a set of aggregate time
dummies capturing aggregate business cycle effects.21
In the first set of equations, we define the mobility from multinational firms to
a purely domestic firm in the same industry as the main destination state. Overall,
we have 246,177 workers (corresponding to 1,131,913 observations), of which 1,748
(2,469) are found to move to a domestic non-multinational firm within the same 3-digit
industry (the same 2-digit industry). We treat as competing events moves to a domestic
non-multinational firm in a different 3-digit industry (11,305 workers), to a different
multinational firm (33,636 workers), to unemployment (23,695) and out of labor market
(23,550). All other observations are treated as censored.22
In our baseline specifications, we include all industries. Overall, results in Table
8 confirm received theoretical predictions. In the sub-distribution hazard function for
the purely domestic firm destination state, the coefficients on the competition variable
(InvCompetition) are positive and statistically significant in the specifications for intra-
industry mobility (columns (i) and (ii)). This turns out to be the case regardless whether
we compute mobility at the three- or the two-digit level. The results suggest that a less
competitive environment with higher price-cost margins is associated to higher worker
mobility between firms in the same industry, which is consistent with the theoretical
predictions of Fosfuri et al. of competition affecting worker mobility adversely.
Furthermore, the coefficients on InvCompetition are considerably smaller in the
specifications for inter-industry mobility. This is coherent with our expectations since
competition within the industry of origin is less obviously associated to the probability
of observing worker transitions to other industries (columns (iii) and (iv)). Taken at
its face value, however, the positive sign tells us that workers are more likely to move
to other industries when profits in the industry of origin are higher. This might be
the case, for instance, if the cost of replacing the worker is positively associated to the
size of the monopoly profits. Firm size is also statistically significant and positive in
the specifications for intra-industry mobility implying that workers are more likely to
move from large firms to domestic firms in the same industry. The estimated param-
eters on age, gender, education and metropolitan Helsinki location are negative and
statistically significant in the specifications for intra-industry mobility, implying that
all these variables are associated to a slow down of the transition to purely domestic
firms. Education and metropolitan Helsinki location have instead positive and signifi-
21See Tables A1 and A2 of the web appendix for summary statistics and correlation table of the
covariates.
22Transfers to self-employment are treated as censored, since these transfers cannot be identified in
a clear-cut way in the data.
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cant coefficients on inter-industry mobility suggesting that these factors accelerate the
transition to purely domestic firms in other industries. Also, firm size has the opposite
effect on inter-industry mobility slowing down the transitions.
Next, we split the sample in high- and low-tech industries and analyze further the
effect of competition on intra-industry mobility at three-digit level of industries.23 In
addition to competition, we analyze the effect of the productivity gap on worker mobil-
ity.24 The productivity gap is expected to enter with a negative sign, indicating that the
smaller the productivity lead of a multinational firm in relation to non-multinational
firms, the larger is the worker mobility between firms in the same industry. Here, we
report only the main coefficients of interest. Full estimates are, however, available in
Tables A4 and A5 of the web appendix.
Overall, results for the main measure of competition in Panel A in Table 9 confirm
the theoretical predictions. In the subdistribution hazard function for the purely do-
mestic firm destination state, the coefficient of InvCompetition variable is positive both
in high- and low-tech industries, but it is larger in high- than in low-tech industries.
Thus, these results suggest that a less competitive environment with higher price-cost
margins is associated with a higher degree of worker mobility between multinational
and non-multinational firms in the same industry both in high- and low-tech industries.
Finally, the sign of the productivity gap is indeed negative and statistically significant,
indicating that the smaller the absorptive capacity of non-multinationals is as com-
pared to multinationals, the less likely are workers to switch from multinational to
non-multinational firms.
We investigate the robustness of our results to the alternative measure of competi-
tion defined in equation (2) in section 4.1. The coefficients of this alternative measure
of competition (Alt InvCompetition) reported in Panel B in Table 9 are positive and
statistically significant in the estimations for high-tech industries. Thus, our main find-
ings turn out to be robust to an alternative proxy for the competitive environment in
high-tech industries. This is not the case, however, in low-tech industries where the co-
efficients of Alt InvCompetition are negative and, thus, opposite to the effects indicated
in Panel A in Table 9.25 However, the coefficient on productivity gap remains negative
23We employ worker mobility measured at the three-digit industries as the main definition of intra-
industry mobility, since mobility measured at the two-digit level of industries is likely to include a
substantial amount of true inter-industry mobility.
24The productivity gap measure is estimated separately for high- and low-tech firms. For multi-plant
firms the productivity is computed as the output weighted average of high- and low-tech plants.
25This puzzle can be rationalized by noticing that the difference between the two measures is given
by the cost of capital which in turn is a function of the level of capital. If in low-tech industries, local
firms with an high level of capital are less likely to attract workers from multinationals, than we will
observe a negative spurious correlation between Alt InvCompetition and mobility. For this to be the
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and significant when using the alternative measure of competition.
Obviously, the fact that our results for multi-to-non-multi mobility in high-tech in-
dustries, discussed so far, match well the theoretical predictions is not a direct test of the
existence of the transmission channel we are interested in. A substantial step forward
can be made by analyzing whether our main findings also apply to other transitions or
whether they are indeed specific to our destination state of interest. In Table 10, we
report the results for worker transitions between multinational firms.26 InvCompetition
variable is negative and statistically significant both in high- and low-tech industries,
indicating that a competitive environment with lower price-cost margins is associated
with higher worker mobility between multinationals, which is opposite to the estimated
effect on mobility from multinationals to non-multinationals. Prodgap enters with a
negative sign in both industry groups. Taken at its face value, this implies that workers
tend to move to other multinationals more often when purely local firms do not lag sub-
stantially behind in terms of productivity.27 When including Prodgap, the coefficient
of InvCompetition variable gets smaller, and it is less precisely estimated in high-tech
industries.
Summarizing, our results for worker mobility from multinationals to non-multinationals
are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Fosfuri et al. across different specifi-
cations in high-tech industries. In particular, more fierce product market competition
and a weaker absorptive capacity are found to be adversely related to within-industry
worker mobility from multinationals to local firms.
4.3 Spillover Effects: Econometric Framework
The mobility analysis provides evidence that worker mobility from MNEs to local firms
is more likely to occur when competition is low and when local firms are not too far
from the technological frontier. In this sub-section we aim to establish whether worker
mobility from multinationals to local firms generates productivity spillover effects in
local firms. We start from the Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yit = AitL
∗βl
it K
βk
it i = 1, 2, ..., N ; t = 1, 2, ...T (4)
case capital and labor with multinational experience are required to be substitutes.
26For completeness we also report the results for transitions to unemployment and out of the labor
market in the web appendix (Table A6).
27We also use as an alternative measure of the productivity gap the difference in productivity between
the sending MNE and the average of MNEs in the same industry. The estimated coefficients for this
alternative productivity gap measure are also negative but larger both in high-tech and low-tech
industries. Results are reported in details in Table A7 of the web appendix.
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where Yit, Kit and L
∗
it denote respectively production, capital stock and quality adjusted
labor of plant i at time t. We follow the approach of Balsvik (2011) and define quality
adjusted labor as equal to:
L∗it = L
N
it + L
M
it (1 + γ) = Lit(1 + γsit) (5)
where LMit and L
N
it denote labor with MNE experience and labor without such experi-
ence, Lit = L
N
it + L
M
it and sit is the share of total labour, Lit with MNE experience. In
this context, the unknown parameter, γ can be interpreted as a positive productivity
premium generated by the technology spillover embodied in LMit . The productivity term
Ait is modelled as follows:
Ait = e
ωit+uit (6)
where ωit denotes shocks to productivity that are potentially observed by firms when
making their input decisions whereas uit represents shocks to productivity that are in-
stead neither observed nor predictable when input levels are chosen. By using equations
(5) and (6), by taking logs and by using the approximation βl lnL
∗βl
it = βl lnL
βl
it +βlγsit,
equation (4) can be rewritten in the following representation:
yit = βllit + βlγsit + βkkit + ωit + uit (7)
where yit, lit, and kit are the logarithms of Yit, Lit, Kit respectively. To recover consis-
tent estimates of the expected effect on productivity of the share of labor with MNE
experience, sit, holding all other input variables fixed, one has to solve the standard
endogeneity problem arising from the fact that both standard input factors (lit, kit) and
the labor share (sit) are not orthogonal to the productivity shock, ωit. This makes both
the pooled OLS and the WG estimators biased and inconsistent.28
In order to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest, we rely on the
identification approach proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (LP, 2003). In later work,
Ackerberg et al. (ACF, 2015) argue that the technique developed by Levinsohn and
Petrin suffers from collinearity problems and that the identification of the parameters of
interest relies on an unintuitive set of assumptions. Both LP and ACF techniques share,
however, a similar two-step semi-parametric econometric approach. Operationally, the
main difference between the two is that whereas LP estimates βl and γ in the first
28In order to be consistent the WG estimator would require ωit = ωi. As noted by Ackerberg
et al. (2015), this is a very strong assumption since it would require the observed component of the
productivity shock to be constant over time for each firm. This is however the benchmark identification
strategy adopted in Balsvik (2011).
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step and βk in the second step, ACF estimates all parameters of interest in the second
step.29 Since we estimate a production function common to all or to large subsets of
industries, we have to take into account the possibility that the composite error term
ωit + uit includes an industry/time specific component which is not orthogonal to sit.
This potentially relevant endogeneity issue can be dealt with within the LP framework
by simply adding a set of industry/time specific binary variables in the first step. A
similar strategy is, however, precluded within the ACF approach where the coefficient
on sit is estimated in the second step. Indeed, the inclusion of time/industry specific
binary variables would make the optimization problem in the second step computation-
ally unfeasible because of the high number of estimated parameters. For this reason,
we adopt the LP technique as our benchmark approach. However, we also briefly com-
ment on the results obtained when using ACF applied to a model which excludes the
industry/time set of binary variables.
4.4 Spillover Effects: Results
Given the purpose of this paper, we estimate plant-level productivity equations sep-
arately for the sub-samples of non-multinational and multinational firms, the latter
including both foreign and domestic MNEs.30 To take into account the possibility that
technology spillovers occur only in high-tech industries, we also allow for the parameters
of interest to differ between high-tech and low-tech firms. In addition to the standard
input variables (labor and capital), each equation includes additional regressors mea-
suring the share of workers who have previously worked in a multinational (MNE) and
the share of workers previously employed in non-multinational firms (non-MNE).31 In
some specifications, we also control for the length of previous tenure (MNE-tenure and
non-MNE-tenure).32
Our basic results obtained when using the LP technique are summarized in Table
11. Obviously, we are mostly interested in the sign and size of the coefficient of the labor
share sMNE and the associated parameter γMNE as estimated on the sample of non-
multinational firms, since this is the technology transmission channel we are focusing
on. Operationally, we define two versions of the labor share; in columns (i), (iii) and (v)
the share sMNE includes all workers who have been hired from MNEs, irrespective of the
29In their approach the purpose of the first step is only to recover estimates of ωit.
30Productivity estimations are carried out at the plant level since plant-level data for capital, labor
and intermediate inputs are more detailed.
31See Tables A8 and A9 for summary statistics and correlation table of the covariates.
32As explained in the previous section, our first step also includes industry/time specific binary
variables. Industries are defined at the two-digit levels.
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length of the previous MNE tenure. In columns (ii), (iv) and (vi), the share sMNE−tenure
includes only workers hired from MNEs with a minimum of two years of previous MNE
tenure.33 The labor shares (snon−MNE) and (snon−MNE−tenure), are defined in the same
way but for the employees hired from non-multinational firms.
For the total sample of non-multinational plants and for the sub-sample of plants
belonging to low-tech firms, the coefficients γMNE and γMNE−tenure turn out to be
statistically insignificant (see columns (i) and (v)). However, for the plants of high-
tech firms (column (iii)), the coefficient, γMNE, is positive and statistically significant.
Furthermore, it is economically sizeable since it implies a productivity premium as
large as 0.372. This means that workers hired from MNEs contribute on average 37.2
percent more to the productivity of the plant than the incumbent workers. The result
is similar for the γMNE−tenure parameter, with a productivity premium of 35.9 percent
associated to the employees with a minimum of two years of previous tenure in a
MNE. This is higher than the productivity premium of 20 percent that Balsvik (2011)
found workers with MNE experience contribute to the productivity of their plant as
compared to workers without such experience. However, a major difference is that we
find a premium only in the sub-sample of high-tech firms while Balsvik did not make
the distinction between industries.34
In order for our identification approach to be convincing, we also have to show that
the productivity premium we estimate is peculiar to the type of worker mobility we are
focusing on, that is, the transitions from multinationals to domestic non-multinational
firms. The first alternative explanation we have to rule out is therefore the possibility
that what matters for the productivity of domestic non-multinational firms is simply
the hiring of new employees, regardless of the characteristics of their previous work
place. This might be the case because new hires have better skills or are likely to put
more effort in order to get tenure or, more simply, to reveal their unknown ability type.
The alternative hypothesis can be tested by looking at the parameters γnon−MNE and
γnon−MNE−tenure as estimated for the plants of high-tech non-multinational firms (see
columns (iii) and (iv)). It turns out that the estimated parameters are much smaller
in size, or even negative, and not different from zero at conventional statistical lev-
33Balsvik (2011) uses this definition of the labor share in her estimations. We have checked that our
results are robust also for the one year of tenure threshold.
34We also allowed for the possibility that the productivity premium associated to multinational
experience in the previous job varies as a function of the length of the tenure in the current job. This
might be the case if it takes time before the knowledge acquired in the previous firm is transferred
and absorbed in the new firm. Overall, we do not find empirical support to the hypothesis that the
productivity premium varies according to the number of years spent in the current job. For details see
Table A10 in the web appendix.
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els. Taken at its face value, this finding corroborates the hypothesis that technology
spillovers through worker mobility are associated to transitions from multinationals
to domestic non-multinational firms, but not to transitions of workers between non-
multinationals.
Another implicit basic assumption of our approach has been so far that the direc-
tion of spillovers through worker mobility is from multinationals to non-multinationals,
and consequently, that spillovers are not relevant in the opposite direction. This need
not to be the case, because multinationals and purely domestic firms might have com-
plementary comparative advantages. For instance, multinationals could benefit from
hiring workers with a more pronounced local background. If this is the case, γnon−MNE
and γnon−MNE−tenure should enter with a positive sign in the equations estimated on
the sample of multinational firms. This conjecture is not supported by the data since
these parameters are not statistically different from zero (columns (vii)-(xii)). However,
multinational firms seem to benefit from hiring workers from other multinationals. In
fact the coefficients γMNE and γMNE−tenure are positive and statistically significant in
the estimations for the total sample of MNEs (columns (vii) and (viii)). However,
the same parameters turn out to be statistically insignificant and much smaller in size
(0.118 and 0.154 respectively) when estimated on the sub-sample of high-tech firms.35
To sum up, results presented in Table 11 show that worker mobility from multi-
national firms to non-multinational firms in high-tech industries generate sizeable pro-
ductivity effects. Furthermore, whether we include all former MNE employees or select
only the employees with some minimum length of tenure matters only slightly for the
size of the productivity premium. Finally, these estimated effects seem to be specific
to the type of mobility we are interested into.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we exploit a large longitudinal employer-employee data set for Finland
to analyze how product market conditions are related to worker mobility from multi-
national to domestic firms. In doing so, we first document the size of this phenomenon.
Overall, purely domestic firms are found to hire mainly workers moving from other
35As mentioned in the previous section, we have also estimated the same set of equations reported
in Table 11, but without industry/time specific dummies in the first step, with the ACF methodology.
Qualitatively, all our findings are fully confirmed. However, the implied productivity premiums turn
out to be higher and perhaps implausibly so. For instance, when focusing on non-multinationals in
high-tech industry it is as high as 84.8%. These additional results are available in Table 11 of the web
appendix.
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domestic firms. However, worker mobility from multinationals, both domestic and for-
eign, is not trivial and has grown substantially over our sample period. In 2004, for
instance, the share of workers in domestic firms with previous tenure in a MNE is as
high as 6.4 percent.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze empirically whether the
degree of competition in an industry enhances or hampers the diffusion of technology
through worker mobility. Our main results show that worker mobility from MNEs
to local firms is more likely to occur when competition is low and when local firms
are not too far from the technological frontier. Also, this occurs especially in high-
tech industries, that is those industries where spillovers are more likely to materialize.
Overall, this evidence is therefore consistent with the theoretical predictions coming
from Fosfuri et al. model.
We also provide further evidence that workers with previous tenure in a MNE are
more productive compared to other workers employed in purely domestic firms. In
particular, workers hired from MNEs in high-tech industries contribute on average
37 percent more to the productivity of the plant than the incumbent workers. This
finding allows us to conclude that the transmission of knowledge spillovers through
worker mobility is indeed present in our data, but rather than being economy-wide, it
is specific to high-tech industries.
Altogether, our analysis presents evidence that competition is adversely related to
worker mobility in industries with productivity spillovers, while it is positively or not
correlated to worker transitions between firms and in industries where spillover effects
are absent. More generally, this paper shows the presence of an additional, and possibly
counter-intuitive, channel through which competition can affect productivity.
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Table 1. Non-multinational and multinational firms and plants
Firms Plants
Total Non-MNEs MNEs Total Non-MNEs MNEs
Number Share Number Share Number Share Number Share
1997 2,304 1,614 0.701 690 0.299 2,813 1,453 0.517 1,310 0.466
1998 2,473 1,725 0.698 748 0.302 2,981 1,546 0.519 1,435 0.481
1999 2,589 1,796 0.694 772 0.298 3,042 1,616 0.531 1,426 0.469
2000 2,690 1,868 0.694 802 0.298 3,007 1,570 0.522 1,437 0.478
2001 2,776 1,930 0.695 828 0.298 3,188 1,680 0.527 1,508 0.473
2002 2,814 1,915 0.681 880 0.313 3,095 1,547 0.500 1,548 0.500
2003 2,854 1,915 0.671 913 0.320 3,137 1,520 0.485 1,617 0.515
2004 2,950 1,944 0.659 965 0.327 3,256 1,556 0.478 1,700 0.522
Note: Manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees and their plants. The total number of firms
can exceed the sum of multinational and non-multinational firms since some firms lack information
about their multinational status.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics on non-multinational and multinational firms (1997-2004 mean and median)
Non-MNEs MNEs
Mean Median Mean Median
Turnover 6,302.6 3312.6 95,092.4 17,677.3
Employees 48.1 30.6 311.6 103.5
Value Added 2,164.5 1289.5 24,285.6 5635.1
Wages/Turnover 0.268 0.247 0.306 0.185
Capital/Turnover 0.458 0.246 1.880 0.269
R&D/Turnover* 0.024 0.003 0.028 0.009
Pric-cost margin** 0.046 0.162 0.174 0.207
No of obs 16,623 7,564
Note: Manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees. * R&D data are collected
for the firms that fulfill the selection criteria of Statistics Finland , see footnote 3.
** Defined as in equation (1).
Table 3. Descriptive statistics on workers’ entry mobility
Entrants in non-MNEs Entrants in MNEs
All entrants New entrants All entrants New entrants
Number
Share of
employed
Number
Share of
employed
Number
Share of
employed
Number
Share of
employed
1997 15,819 0.167 5,078 0.054 43,817 0.181 11,563 0.048
1998 17,125 0.181 5,907 0.063 47,702 0.188 12,383 0.049
1999 18,215 0.190 6,186 0.064 50,268 0.202 13,879 0.056
2000 19,867 0.207 7,379 0.077 56,122 0.213 16,789 0.064
2001 20,381 0.222 6,495 0.071 63,268 0.236 24,206 0.090
2002 18,947 0.227 5,206 0.062 59,410 0.227 12,297 0.047
2003 18,254 0.227 4,746 0.059 59,484 0.231 10,728 0.042
2004 19,236 0.241 5,155 0.064 60,740 0.235 12,500 0.048
Note: All individuals moving to manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees are included.
Manuscript, including figures and tables Click here to download Manuscript, including figures and tables
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics on workers’ entry mobility - Entrants in non-MNEs by source
All entrants in non-MNEs
from MNEs from non-MNEs
Number
Share of
employed
Number
Share of
employed
1997 967 0.010 13,578 0.144
1998 2,273 0.024 13,583 0.144
1999 2,934 0.031 13,569 0.141
2000 3,833 0.040 14,503 0.151
2001 4,502 0.049 14,484 0.158
2002 4,162 0.050 13,555 0.162
2003 4,435 0.055 12,782 0.159
2004 5,086 0.064 13,134 0.164
Note: All individuals moving to non-multinational manufacturing
firms with at least 20 employees are included.
Table 5. Characteristics of entrants at entry year (1997-2004 mean and median)
Entrants to non-MNEs
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
All entrants
Entrants
with tenure
from MNEs
Entrants
with tenure
from non-MNEs
Test of equality
of means
(ii) and (iii)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-value
Age 31.6 29.0 39.7 39.0 38.3 38.0 8.83***
Education years 11.8 12.0 12.3 12.0 12.0 12.0 8.64***
Previous tenure in years 3.36 1.0 8.6 6.0 6.6 4.0 17.8***
Gender (share of female workers) 0.296 0.246 0.240
Number of observations 91,254 9,521 5,703
Entrants to MNEs
(v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
All entrants
Entrants
with tenure
from MNEs
Entrants
with tenure
from non-MNEs
Test of equality
of means
(vi) and (vii)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-value
Age 31.1 28.0 40.2 39.0 35.5 34.0 46.87***
Education years 12.4 12.0 13.0 12.0 12.6 12.0 15.31***
Previous tenure in years 3.90 1.0 8.6 5.0 6.0 4.0 33.40***
Gender (share of female workers) 0.350 0.297 0.280
Number of observations 209,410 31,297 13,601
Note: ”With tenure” include entrants with a minimum of two years of tenure from the previous employer.
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics on annual transitions of workers
From MNEs
to non-MNEs
From MNEs
to MNEs
From non-MNEs
to non-MNEs
From non-MNEs
to MNEs
Number
Share of
employed
Number
Share of
employed
Number
Share of
employed
Number
Share of
employed
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
1997 3,895 0.016 6,328 0.026 3,799 0.040 1,679 0.018
1998 4,600 0.018 9,613 0.038 3,917 0.041 1,449 0.015
1999 5,380 0.022 8,884 0.036 4,898 0.051 2,606 0.027
2000 5,444 0.021 17,644 0.067 4,389 0.046 1,851 0.019
2001 4,494 0.017 7,082 0.026 3,857 0.042 1,444 0.016
2002 4,567 0.017 6,419 0.025 3,210 0.038 1,580 0.019
2003 4,486 0.017 6,614 0.026 3,349 0.042 1,155 0.014
2004 5,305 0.021 11,669 0.045 4,126 0.052 1,583 0.020
Note: All individuals moving from manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees are included. Some
individuals lack information about the multinational status of their new employer and are therefore missing
Transitions of employees due to ownership changes of plants or firms are excluded.
Table 7. Descriptive statistics on annual worker separations from MNEs to non-MNEs
Low/medium-tech industries High-tech industry
Total Share of Total Share of
Number
Share of
employed
Intra-
industry
Inter-
industry
Number
Share of
employed
Intra-
industry
Inter-
industry
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
1997 2,476 0.016 0.119 0.881 1,419 0.017 0.077 0.923
1998 2,835 0.017 0.079 0.921 1,765 0.020 0.081 0.919
1999 3,038 0.019 0.125 0.875 2,342 0.024 0.085 0.915
2000 3,074 0.018 0.129 0.871 2,370 0.025 0.032 0.968
2001 2,634 0.015 0.088 0.921 1,860 0.019 0.041 0.959
2002 2,753 0.017 0.123 0.877 1,814 0.019 0.035 0.965
2003 2,851 0.018 0.147 0.853 1,635 0.017 0.060 0.940
2004 3,254 0.020 0.097 0.903 2,051 0.022 0.211 0.789
Note: All individuals moving from manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees are included. Some
individuals lack information about the multinational status of their new employer and are therefore missing
Transitions of employees due to ownership changes of plants or firms are excluded. Intra- and inter industry
mobility is defined at 3-digit level of industry classification (NACE rev 2).
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Table 8. Mobility equations - Movers from MNEs to non-MNEs
Intra-industry Inter-industry
Level of industry 3-digit 2-digit 3-digit 2-digit
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
InvCompetition 0.178*** 0.155*** 0.044** 0.050***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Log firm size 0.351*** 0.335*** -0.153*** -0.144***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
Age -0.013*** -0.022*** -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender -0.229*** -0.197*** -0.187*** -0.186***
(0.057) (0.048) (0.022) (0.022)
Marital status 0.065 0.093** 0.035 0.023
(0.055) (0.047) (0.022) (0.023)
Parenthood status -0.036 -0.036 -0.0002 -0.004
(0.041) (0.034) (0.015) (0.015)
Education -0.050*** -0.046*** 0.033*** 0.037***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Income -0.064 0.024 -0.190*** -0.207***
(0.048) (0.044) (0.016) (0.016)
Location -0.467*** -0.511*** 0.248*** 0.286***
(0.080) (0.069) (0.025) (0.025)
Wald test of joint sign. 2,953.24 2,914.64 13,120.75 13,092.76
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 1,131,913 1,131,913 1,131,913 1,131,913
No of subjects 246,177 246,177 246,177 246,177
No of failed 1,748 2,469 11,305 10,584
No. competing 92,186 91,465 82,629 83,350
Note: InvCompetition is defined as in equation (1). Year dummies are included.
Firm-year clustered standard error (probability levels) in round (square)
brackets. *** significant at the one,** at the five and *at ten percent level.
Table 9. Mobility equations - Movers from MNEs to non-MNEs within high- and low-tech industries
High-tech Low-tech
Panel A (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
InvCompetition 1.262*** 1.339*** 0.249*** 0.242***
(0.135) (0.137) (0.026) (0.025)
Prodgap -0.357*** -0.926***
(0.076) (0.063)
Wald test of joint sign. 1,686.68 1,765.15 1,637.82 1,555.14
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Panel B
Alt InvCompetition 1.047*** 2.333*** -4.314*** -3.959***
(0.540) (0.541) (0.619) (0.597)
Prodgap -0.338*** -0.913***
(0.076) (0.063)
Wald test of joint sign. 2,027.88 2,052.75 1717.00 1,638.37
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 275,088 275,088 640,996 640,996
No of subjects 73,696 73,696 136,989 136,989
No of failed 551 551 949 949
No. competing 27,889 27,889 43,750 43,750
Note: InvCompetition defined as in equation (1) and Prodgap as in equation (3) for 3-digit
industries. All the same control variables as in Table 8 are included as additional regressors.
Firm-year clustered standard errors (probability levels) in round (square) brackets.
*** significant at the one, ** at the five and *at ten percent level.
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Table 10. Mobility equations - Movers from MNEs to MNEs within high and low-tech industries
High-tech Low-tech
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
InvCompetition -0.211*** -0.078 -0.104*** -0.068***
(0.067) (0.066) (0.025) (0.021)
Prodgap -0.223*** -0.498***
(0.034) (0.042)
Wald test of joint sign. 14,260.20 14,220.70 4,308.00 5,412.93
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 275,088 275,088 640,996 640,996
No of subjects 73,696 73,696 136,989 136,989
No of failed 6,950 6,950 3,708 3,708
No. competing 21,490 21,490 40,991 40,991
Note: InvCompetition defined as in equation (1) and Prodgap as in equation (3) for 3-digit
industries. All the same control variables as in Table 8 are included as additional regressors.
Firm-year clustered standard errors (probability levels) in round (square) brackets.
*** significant at the one, ** at the five and *at ten percent level.
Table 11. Productivity estimations
Non-multinationals Multinationals
Total High-tech Low-tech Total High-tech Low-tech
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii)
l 0.676*** 0.676*** 0.724*** 0.722*** 0.666*** 0.666*** 0.595*** 0.595*** 0.734*** 0.734*** 0.551*** 0.551***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.038) (0.038) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.036) (0.032) (0.027) (0.028)
k 0.129*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.118** 0.119** 0.123*** 0.123**
(0.035) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.030) (0.028) (0.051) (0.052) (0.035) (0.037)
s MNE 0.121 0.269** 0.064 0.139* 0.087 0.114
(0.078) (0.135) (0.102) (0.075) (0.095) (0.097)
s MNE 0.137 0.259** 0.085 0.186** 0.113 0.156
-tenure (0.086) (0.131) (0.125) (0.077) (0.101) (0.118)
s non-MNE 0.041 -0.019 0.050 0.053 0.087 -0.008
(0.038) (0.092) (0.050) (0.062) (0.086) (0.080)
s non-MNE 0.055 0.020 0.053 0.056 0.043 0.000
-tenure (0.048) (0.103) (0.051) (0.079) (0.107) (0.089)
Structural parameters
γMNE 0.179 0.372** 0.095 0.233** 0.118 0.207
(0.116) (0.185) (0.154) (0.127) (0.130) (0.177)
γMNE−tenure 0.203 0.359** 0.128 0.313** 0.154 0.283
(0.129) (0.181) (0.189) (0.129) (0.139) (0.217)
γnon MNE 0.060 -0.026 0.074 0.088 0.118 -0.014
(0.057) (0.127) (0.076) (0.105) (0.118) (0.144)
γnon−MNE 0.081 0.028 0.080 0.094 0.058 0.000
−tenure (0.071) (0.142) (0.077) (0.133) (0.147) (0.163)
No. obs 10,821 10,821 2,127 2,127 8,694 8,694 9,450 9,450 2,554 2,554 6,893 6,893
Note: Dependent variable: ln(value added). All regressions include industry-year interaction dummies in the first step.
***significant at the one, ** at the five and * at the ten percent level. Standard errors clustered on plants in parenthesis.
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Web Appendix: Additional Tables
Table A1. Summary statistics of variables in mobility estimations
Variable Mean St. Dev.
InvCompetition 0.191 0.469
Alt InvCompetition 0.125 0.055
Log firm size 6.980 1.484
Age 42.917 9.875
Gender 0.285 0.451
Marital status 0.596 0.491
Parenthood status 0.267 0.614
Education 12.036 2.204
Income 10.308 0.392
Location 0.126 0.332
Nr obs 1,131,913
Table A2. Correlation table of variables in mobility estimations
Variable InvCom. Alt InvC. Log f. size Age Gender Marital st. Parent. st Educat. Income Location
InvCompetition 1.000
Alt InvCompetition 0.163 1.000
Log firm size -0.079 0.230 1.000
Age -0.083 -0.120 -0.019 1.000
Gender 0.014 0.015 -0.025 0.047 1.000
Marital status -0.016 -0.022 0.003 0.279 -0.038 1.000
Parenthood status 0.031 0.038 0.009 -0.349 -0.072 0.151 1.000
Education 0.065 0.082 0.089 -0.212 -0.075 0.058 0.146 1.000
Income -0.059 0.048 0.160 0.180 -0.334 0.143 -0.001 0.325 1.000
Location 0.070 0.050 0.087 -0.028 0.074 -0.040 0.004 0.143 0.087 1.000
Nr obs 1,131,913
Table A3. Mobility equations - Movers from MNEs to non-MNE with negative values of Prodgap not replaced
High-tech Low-tech
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
InvCompetition 1.424*** 0.216***
(0.148) (0.030)
Alt InvCompetition 2.079*** -2.710***
(0.518) (0.602)
Prodgap-with negative values -0.481*** -0.353*** -1.331*** -1.308***
(0.060) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048)
Wald test of joint sign. 1,696.11 2,159.36 1,861,85 2,041.54
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 275,088 275,088 640,996 640,996
No of subjects 73,696 73,696 136,989 136,989
No of failed 551 551 949 949
No. competing 27,889 27,889 43,750 43,750
Note: InvCompetition defined as in equation (1) and Prodgap as in equation (3)
All the same control variables .as in Table 8 are included as additional regressors.
Firm-year clustered standard errors (probability levels) in round (square) brackets.
*** significant at the one, ** at the five and *at ten percent level.
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Table A4. Mobility equations - Movers from MNEs to non-MNEs within high- and low-tech industries - Full estimates
High-tech Low-tech High-tech Low-tech
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
InvCompetition 1.262*** 1.339*** 0.249*** 0.242***
(0.135) (0.137) (0.026) (0.025)
Alt InvCompetition 1.047*** 2.333*** -4.314*** -3.959***
(0.540) (0.541) (0.619) (0.597)
Prodgap -0.357*** -0.926*** -0.338*** -0.913***
(0.076) (0.063) (0.076) (0.063)
Log firm size -0.021 0.071 -0.492*** -0.288*** 0.030 0.098 -0.512*** -0.311***
(0.039) (0.042) (0.023) (0.025) (0.041) (0.043) (0.023) (0.024)
Age -0.002 -0.004 -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Gender -0.031 -0.018 -0.354*** -0.367*** -0.032 -0.033 -0.377*** -0.382***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.082) (0.083) (0.090) (0.090) (0.083) (0.083)
Marital status 0.178* 0.177* 0.037 0.042 0.175* 0.175* 0.034 0.038
(0.097) (0.097) (0.075) (0.075) (0.097) (0.097) (0.075) (0.075)
Parenthood status -0.185** -0.185** 0.020 0.024 -0.188** -0.190** 0.020 0.020
(0.077) (0.077) (0.054) (0.054) (0.078) (0.078) (0.054) (0.054)
Education -0.095*** -0.090*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.092*** -0.087*** -0.051*** -0.048***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
Income -0.032 -0.019 -0.064 -0.021 -0.029 -0.014 0.003 0.045
(0.051) (0.054) (0.093) (0.099) (0.053) (0.056) (0.098) (0.104)
Location -1.779*** -1.784*** 0.115 0.180 -1.692*** -1.685*** 0.093 0.170
0.199 0.201 0.106 0.108 0.197 0.197 0.106 0.106
Wald test of joint sign. 1,686.68 1,765.15 1,637.82 1,555.14 2,027.88 2,052.75 1717.00 1,638.37
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 275,088 275,088 640,996 640,996 275,088 275,088 640,996 640,996
No of subjects 73,696 73,696 136,989 136,989 73,696 73,696 136,989 136,989
No of failed 551 551 949 949 551 551 949 949
No. competing 27,889 27,889 43,750 43,750 27,889 27,889 43,750 43,750
Note: InvCompetition defined as in equation (1) and Prodgap as in equation (3) for 3-digit industries. Year dummies are included.
Firm-year clustered standard errors (probability levels) in round (square) brackets.
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Table A5. Mobility equations - Movers from MNEs to MNEs within high- and low-tech industries - Full estimates
Industry High-tech Low-tech
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
InvCompetition -0.211*** -0.078 -0.104*** -0.068***
(0.067) (0.066) (0.025) (0.021)
Prodgap -0.223*** -0.498***
(0.034) (0.042)
Log firm size 0.641*** 0.695*** -0.185*** -0.064***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.009) (0.015)
Age 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender -0.285*** -0.268*** -0.004 -0.006
(0.030) (0.030) (0.041) (0.041)
Marital status 0.018 0.015 0.042 0.043
(0.029) (0.029) (0.038) (0.038)
Parenthood status 0.028 0.027 -0.035 -0.032
(0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.030)
Education 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.018** 0.019**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Income 0.294 0.304 0.802*** 0.826***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.047) (0.047)
Location -0.019*** -0.041*** -0.141** -0.064***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.057) (0.015)
Wald test of joint sign. 14,260.20 14,220.70 4,308.00 5,412.93
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 275,088 275,088 640,996 640,996
No of subjects 73,696 73,696 136,989 136,989
No of failed 6,950 6,950 3,708 3,708
No. competing 21,490 21,490 40,991 40,991
Note: InvCompetition defined as in equation (3) and Prodgap as in equation
(5) for 3-digit industries. Year dummies are included. Firm-year clustered
standard error (probability levels) in round (square)brackets.
Table A6. Mobility equations - Movers to other destinations in high- and low-tech industries
Out of labor market To unemployment
High-tech Low-tech High-tech Low-tech
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
InvCompetition -0.037*** -0.053 -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.015 0.106*** 0.052*** 0.045***
(0.046) (0.047) (0.029) (0.020) (0.040) (0.041) (0.015) (0.016)
Prodgap 0.079*** 0.065*** -0.691*** -0.219***
(0.035) (0.020) (0.044) (0.021)
Wald test of joint sign. 5002.50 5012.91 11,116.39 11,116.39 6106.76 6595.18 14,422.74 14,373.95
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 275,088 275,088 640,996 640,996 275,088 275,088 640,996 640,996
No of subjects 73,696 73,696 136,989 136,989 73,696 73,696 136,989 136,989
No of failed 5,422 5,422 13,581 13,581 5,043 5,043 14,804 14,804
No. competing 23,018 23,018 31,118 31,118 23,397 23,397 29,895 29,895
Note: InvCompetition defined as in equation (1) and Prodgap as in equation (3) for 3-digit industries. All the
same control variables as in Table 8 are included as additional regressors. Firm-year clustered standard errors
(probability levels) in round (square) brackets.
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Table A7. Mobility equations - Movers from MNEs to MNEs with MNE productivity gap
High-tech Low-tech
(i) (ii)
InvCompetition -0.424*** -0.098***
(0.066) (0.025)
Prodgap -to multinationals -0.921*** -0.745***
(0.065) (0.084)
Wald test of joint sign. 14,557.60 4,595.20
[0.00] [0.00]
Observations 275,088 640,996
No of subjects 73,696 136,989
No of failed 6,950 3,708
No. competing 21,490 40,991
Note: InvCompetition defined as in equation (1) and Prodgap as in equation (3) where
the nominator is the average productivity of multinationals in the 3-digit industry.
All the same control variables as in Table 8 are included as additional regressors. Firm-year
clustered standard errors (probability levels) in round (square) brackets.
Table A8. Summary statistics of variables in productivity estimations
Multinationals Non-multinationals
Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
va 8.576 1.400 7.378 0.849
l 4.992 1.200 4.180 0.715
k 8.132 1.927 6.675 1.106
m 9.177 1.569 7.745 1.106
s MNE 0.076 0.148 0.036 0.079
s MNE-tenure 0.059 0.132 0.025 0.068
s non-MNE 0.133 0.166 0.164 0.160
s non-MNE-tenure 0.094 0.147 0.110 0.138
Nr obs 9,450 10,821
Table A9. Correlation table of variables in productivity estimations
Variable va l k m s MNE s MNE-tenure s non-MNE s non-MNE-tenure
va 1.000
l 0.873 1.000
k 0.750 0.723 1.000
m 0.842 0.802 0.747 1.000
s MNE 0.112 0.075 -0.011 0.104 1.000
s MNE-tenure 0.113 0.078 -0.004 0.098 0.962 1.000
s non-MNE -0.118 -0.118 -0.197 -0.122 -0.048 -0.060 1.000
s non-MNE-tenure -0.084 -0.089 -0.152 -0.094 -0.048 -0.057 0.935 1.000
Nr obs 20,271
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Table A10. Productivity estimations allowing for tenure effects
Tenure in the current job
Number of years since entry m = 1 m = 2 m = 3
(ii) (iii) (iv)
s new MNE 0.420** 0.277* 0.192
(0.214) (0.158) (0.149)
s old MNE 0.171 0.241 0.418**
(0.201) (0.230) (0.194)
s all non-MNE -0.011 -0.009 -0.008
(0.090) (0.091) (0.094)
Structural parameters
γnewMNE 0.581** 0.383* 0.265
(0.297) (0.215) (0.203)
γold MNE 0.237 0.333 0.577**
(0.276) (0.317) (0.266)
γall non MNE -0.015 -0.013 -0.300
(0.124) (0.126) (0.348)
No. obs 2,127 2,127 2,127
Note: Dependent variable: ln(value added). Includes entrants with at least
one year of previous tenure. All regressions include industry-year interaction
dummies in the first step. Standard errors clustered on plants in parenthesis.
Table A11. Productivity estimations - ACF method
Non-multinationals Multinationals
Total High-tech Low-tech Total High-tech Low-tech
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
l 0.809*** 0.805*** 0.791*** 0.742*** 0.964*** 0.629***
(0.029) (0.040) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038) (0.034)
k 0.163*** 0.115*** 0.181*** 0.256*** 0.093*** 0.317***
(0.013) (0.022) (0.015) (0.030) (0.033) (0.024)
s MNE-tenure 0.451** 0.681** 0.344 0.285 0.380 0.074
(0.219) (0.347) (0.284) (0.182) (0.236) (0.214)
s non-MNE 0.054 0.043 0.117 0.085 -0.136 0.002
-tenure (0.085) (0.167) (0.099) (0.218) (0.340) (0.209)
Structural parameters
γMNE−tenure 0.561** 0.848* 0.434 0.391 0.397* 0.121
(0.276) (0.437) (0.359) (0.255) (0.235) (0.341)
γnon−MNE−tenure 0.067 0.054 0.148 0.115 -0.139 0.003
(0.105) (0.208) (0.124) (0.301) (0.339) (0.335)
No. obs 10,821 2,127 8,694 9,450 2,554 6,893
Note: Dependent variable: ln(value added). *** significant at the one, ** at the five
and * at the ten percent level. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis.
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